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Abstract
Shadow banking systems were developing rapidly in the Western economies during the last 
two decades. Research from recent years show that within the last years equally important 
process of shadow banking development occurs in some emerging markets, and among oth-
ers, in China. The system was not only a sophisticated part of China’s financial market, but 
played very important role in the development of the Chinese economy. The aim of this arti-
cle is a description of the mechanisms of shadow banking development in China, character-
istics of the main threats of this system and the regulatory approach in the country. Despite 
many threats, the shadow banking system plays an important role in the Chinese econo-
my. There is a need for its regulation and support for further development.
Paper type: review article
Keywords: Chinese financial market, shadow banking, trust companies, wealth manage-
ment products
Introduction
Shadow banking is evolving mainly in developed countries. The Financial Stabili-
ty Board estimates that in 2014 more than 80% of global shadow banking assets re-
side in advanced economies (FSB Financial Stability Board, 2015, p. 2). Despite that 
there are several countries classified as an emerging economy or developing coun-
try, where the system is growing very rapidly. Among them is China. The country 
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belongs to 26 jurisdictions which the FSB is monitoring the development of shad-
ow banking and treating the sector as an important part of country’s financial mar-
ket. China is the leading emerging country where shadow banking is developing 
rapidly. Actually the Chinese share of global shadow banking assets is 8% (the end 
of 2014) and it is very rapidly developing (in the 2010 it was only 2% of the glob-
al shadow banking) (Canuto, 2015). The article concerns the issue of the Chinese 
shadow banking development and the regulatory responses to the threats stem-
ming from the system. The main motive was to synthesize the issues and assess the 
introduced regulatory changes.
1.  The importance and characteristics of Chinese shadow 
banking
The shadow banking in China is similarly defined as in another countries. The Peo-
ple’s Bank of China defines it as “a credit intermediation involving entities and ac-
tivities outside the regular banking system, that provides liquidity and credit trans-
formation” (Elliot, Kroeber, & Qiao, 2015, p. 4). The system in China differs from 
shadow banking in another countries in its structure (Table 1).
Table 1 The comparison between shadow banking in China and in Western countries
China’s shadow banking Western shadow banking
Domestic financial system Both domestic and foreign financial system
Mainly driven by commercial banks Mainly driven by non-bank financial institutions
Underdeveloped secondary market Well-developed secondary market
Low securitization rate High securitization rate
Low leverage rate High leverage rate
Purchases made by individual investors Purchases made by institutional investors
Immature development phase with inherent risks More mature development phase
Irregular fund raising and lending operations More regular fund raising and lending operations
Source: van der Linden, 2015, pp. 111–114.
By contrast to Western economies, where shadow banking refers to an invest-
ment management scheme on the financial market, China’s shadow banking is 
playing an active role in broadening investment channels to the private sector. The 
Chinese shadow banking consists of less complex financial instruments. The system 
is shallow, does not have any protection from the state, and is quite underdeveloped 
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in the institutional side. The other important feature of the system is that it is more 
strictly interconnected to the traditional banking than shadow banking systems in 
other countries. Comparison to the shadow banking in the United States and China 
shows that the Chinese system is based on implicit guarantees and is bank oriented, 
whereas the American system is based on financial engineering and is oriented on 
capital market (Van der Linden, 2015; Elliot et al., 2015; Dang, Wang, & Yao, 2014).
In the Chinese model it resembles straightforward lending. It allows to develop 
lending activity and to bypass the regulations imposed on the operations. In the lit-
erature are enumerated three major groups of shadow banking entities:
– banks with their Wealth Management Products (WMP),
– non bank financial institutions, e.g. trusts, brokers, insurance companies, 
security funds and leasing companies,
– financial intermediaries for small businesses and underprivileged consum-
ers (Zhang, 2014, pp. VII–VIII).
Strong regulations for banks and very low official rates of interests have led 
banks for searching alternative ways of investments. One of the best alternatives to 
traditional products offered by banks in China are WMP. They are products created 
by trust companies – intermediaries which are not allowed by law to accept depos-
its or lend out money, but they are allowed to manage them. Trust companies use 
traditional banks as their agents and by this way collected money and invest them 
in market companies and different enterprises. Banks connected with trust com-
panies roll out loans off balance sheet into trust products, which banks then resold 
to retail customers. WMP provide returns based on the performance of a pool of 
underlying assets. Some of the investments are typical credit like investments, but 
other are more speculative products, oriented on different risky issues like spirits, 
graveyards or even more imaginative investments. The high risk inclined in such 
products are cushioned by collateral and downgraded by leverage (The credit cu-
lacs, 2013). WMPs play significant role in the Chinese financial system – together 
with trust products they represent over 50% of China’s GDP and create the shadow 
banking system in China (Sekine, 2015).
Apart from the traditional banks, Chinese shadow banking includes also non-
bank institutions, like microfinance companies, guarantee companies, leasing enti-
ties and some other similar institutions. Their aim is to help encourage credit access 
for small and rural borrowers (Elliot et al., 2015). Significant role in Chinese shad-
ow banking play trust companies and created by the companies Trust Products.2 
Trust companies are a special institutions that engage in the financial intermedia-
tion that the traditional banking sector and capital market cannot fulfill. They are 
able to invest in the money market businesses, capital market businesses, and al-
2 Trust Products are financial transactions undertaken and managed by trust companies.
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ternative investments. During last few years trust companies invested in China in 
selected industries, like: manufacturing, energy transportation and construction, 
mining, electricity, gas and water production, wholesale and retail, software and IT 
services and real estate sector (Sheng & Soon, 2015).
Table 2 Comparison between Wealth Management Products and Trust Products – the main 
components of Chinese shadow banking
Wealth Management Products Trust Products
The main 
creating 
institutions 
WMPs are typically structured and 
sold by banks as savings products but 
are recorded off banks’ balance sheets, 
and hence, not subject to the deposit 
regulation.
Trust products are structured by non-bank 
financial institutions like trusts, brokers, in-
surance companies, and security firms. These 
entities typically need to cooperate with banks 
in reaching out to individuals or corporate 
savers.
Investment 
goals
Invested mainly in interbank lending 
and interbank bond markets.
Funds raised by trust products are channeled 
to riskier borrowers (e.g. property develop-
ers, mining companies and local government 
financing vehicles) as trust loans.
Growth China’s WMP have grown rapidly, 
from less than ¥500 billion in 2004 to 
¥9.5 trillion by the end of 2013.
Trust industry became the second largest 
subsector of China’s financial system in 2012, 
with total assets of ¥7.47 trillion, up from 
¥1.24 trillion in 2008. The total assets of the 
trust sector were ¥12.48 trillion by June 2014.
Source: based on Dang et al., 2014; Liansheng, 2015.
The last group of Chinese shadow banking entities is formed by non-bank 
finan cial intermediaries, which activity is oriented on the small businesses and in-
dividual consumers. Among such institutions are: micro lenders, pawn shoppers 
and the underground black market (Dang et al., 2015).
2.  The reasons of development shadow banking in China 
during 2005–2015
Shadow banking in China is developing very quickly, especially after the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009. It is estimated that the annual growth of non-financial inter-
mediaries in China in the period 2010–2012 was growing at a rate of 34% per year 
(Labes, 2013). The system started to develop at the end of 1990s, but its rapid de-
velopment and the increase in coverage occurred in the last few years. It is reflect-
ed by the statistical data on the size and composition of shadow banking in Chi-
na (Table 3).
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Table 3 Size and composition of China’s shadow banking (in RMB 1 bilion)
Year Entrusted 
loans
Trusted 
loans
Bankers’ 
acceptan-
ces
Interbank 
entrusted 
loan  
payments
Financial 
leasing
Small loan 
companies
Total
2002 267 0 256 523
2003 328 0 457 784
2004 639 0 428 1067
2005 836 0 430 1266
2006 1105 172 580 444 2212
2007 1442 342 1250 558 3503
2008 1868 657 1357 738 4530
2009 2546 1093 1818 628 5995
2010 3421 1480 4152 1680 270 198 11111
2011 4717 1683 5179 1872 426 391 14180
2012 6001 2972 6229 2894 608 592 19207
2013 8551 4812 7004 3000 766 819 24952
Source: Elliot et al., 2015, p. 10.
The Chinese credit system is dominated by banks. They are the main credit sup-
plies in the country. The other sectors of the Chinese financial market are under-
developed and businesses cannot treat them as an important source of financing. 
The data concerning 2012 states that banks provide the private sector with credit 
amounting to 128% of GDP, whereas the bond market provides credit equivalent 
to 41% of GDP and the stock market capitalization was about 44% of GDP (Elliot 
& Yan, 2013, p. 7). Despite rapid growth of the Chinese stock market during the last 
years, much of securities purchases are made by banks what means that it is diffi-
cult to diversify the financing source. Among the main features indicating the dom-
inance of banking sector are:
– the legal position of banks in the country (they are mainly state owned and 
state controlled),
– the state protection for banks against competition and implicit guarantees,
– the prudential regulations concerning lending activities which determine 
the privileged position of banks (Elliot et al., 2015).
The position of traditional banking sector determines shadow banking devel-
opment in the country. Shadow banking in China is acting as a substitute for fi-
nancing within the formal financial system. Its development is caused by a desire to 
circumvent the existing regulatory impediments. The banking sector did not pro-
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vide financing for businesses in the level as it is needed in the fast growing econo-
my. This situation is caused by the number of regulations imposed on bank lending 
(e.g. the limits of bank loans to deposits, discouragements on lending to certain in-
dustries, caps on bank lending volumes imposed by the central bank, etc.). The lim-
ited credit availability is particularly severe for small and medium-sized enterpris-
es, which started to searching alternative ways of financing. The opportunities for 
savings and other forms of investment for the commonage and the small business-
es are also limited (Allison, 2015). In order to circumvent the regulatory measures 
banks have started cooperation with shadow banks.
 An important factor, which led to the development of Chinese shadow banking 
were the interest rates in the country. The interest rates are being strictly controlled 
by the Chinese government (e.g. by the deposit rate ceiling), what led to the situation 
when real interest rates were either close to zero or negative. The aim of the policy 
was to artificially reduce the relative price of capital, especially for selected branch-
es of industry. Commercial banks were trying to evade the regulatory restrictions on 
deposit rate and interest rate. The maximum interest rate allowed by the regulations 
was 3.3%. The very low or close-to-zero interest rates resulted with withdrawal de-
posits from banks and search for new, higher-yielding investments. Banks were try-
ing to limit the deposit outflows by increasing household investments return and to 
provide higher level of financing to the private sector. To achieve this they started 
to operate in the shadow banking system. In accordance with the law the big state-
owned enterprises had an easy access to cheap bank credit, while more efficient pri-
vate enterprises were struggling for financing. The development of shadow bank-
ing allowed such private-owned enterprises better access for capital (Wang, Wang, 
Wang, & Zhou, 2015). It had a positive impact on the entire economy. The system 
helped to fuel the Chinese economic growth by making financial services widely 
available to a larger group of the country’s population at a cheaper price.
In the Chinese system banks were not able to give loans for unsecured compa-
nies, like real estate developers or coal miners. Such enterprises were forced to pay 
high rate of interest, but the banks had to give loans to the state-owned enterprises 
firstly, and had a short of capital to finance the more risky enterprises. On the oth-
er hand they were motivated to give loans to private enterprises, which guaranteed 
higher return. In order to collect necessary deposits they set up WMPs, and offered 
them via a trust companies to keep the transactions off the bank’s books. By the way 
they were able to offer loans to the private enterprises. The interbank rates connect-
ed with the off-balance transactions were higher than the official rates. Due to the 
fact banks were able to collect very easily additional deposits when official interest 
rates were kept at the very low level, and many individual investors were looking for 
favorable investment opportunities.
The crisis that began in 2007 in the United States also moved to China. It caused 
a decline in the FDI inflow and export decrease. In response, the Chinese govern-
ment has prepared a stimulus package for Chinese economy, amounting to 586 bil-
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lion USD. The money not only boosted the real economy, but also strengthened the 
Chinese financial market, opened various channels of financing investments and 
resulted in the development of shadow banking. The system was considered as nec-
essary for the development of Chinese economy. Non-bank shadow banking chan-
nels have a number of key advantages over the traditional banking, which were 
hampered by the rigid rules. It has grown very rapidly after the financial crisis and 
enlarged its share (Figure 1).
Figure 1.  Chinese shadow banking system, as a percentage of GDP during 2004−2014.
Source: Bloomberg and CEIC in Dang et al., 2015, p. 28.
The Figure 1 shows that after the financial crisis the total credit level increased 
its share in relation to the bank loans. It was a consequence of the policy adopted 
in response to the crisis.
3. Crisis on the horizon
The functioning of shadow banking in China, like in other countries, is associated 
with high risk. It is due to the fact that the system is unregulated and is not protected 
by a lender of last resort. Among the main threats are risks of liquidity and solven-
cy, moral hazard, interconnectedness between shadow banking entities and regular 
banking system, and the most important which comes from the nature of shadow 
banking – the systemic risk.
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Some economists argue, that Chinese shadow banking is associated with low-
er risk in comparison to other countries, because its constituent institutions do not 
use aggressive strategies such as hedge funds, investment funds and other such en-
tities and they do not use so high leverages as are being used in foreign shadow 
banking systems. They are less involved in the securitization process and do not use 
instruments like derivatives, CDOs, CDS, etc. and such long chain of financial in-
termediation as in some other countries are nonexistent.
The counterargument is that products like WMPs or Trust Products which are 
widespread in Chinese shadow banking cause the same risks and can be the same 
opaque to the complicated derivatives. Moreover, China’s shadow banking is linked 
with the real economy to a greater extent. It means that if the crisis happens, the 
problems of the institutions forming the shadow banking will have a great impact 
on the real economy. Among the most endangered entities are: real estate develop-
ers, coal miners and steel makers. The dangers stem from some trust companies, in-
volved in lending to the branches and endangered by maturity mismatch.
During the last several years the Chinese shadow banking was very helpful for 
the real economy, but in time of turbulence it will have the opposite effect. The tra-
ditional banks by participation in the shadow banking started lending to local gov-
ernments and supplying large, credit intensive infrastructure projects. Many of the 
projects were of poor quality (e.g. returns do not compensate risks). If some of the 
long-term investments fail, the banks will have big financial problems in the future. 
In a case of default the investors are prone to lose their capital. The other threat aris-
es from the fact that the WMPs are associated with liquidity risk. The products at-
tracted short term deposits and invested in longer term investments. In case of li-
quidity problems, there will be negative influence on banks and other institutions, 
which are not able to roll out their liabilities.
Originally among the WMPs’ investors were real estate companies and mu-
nicipalities. Unfortunately since 2013, these businesses were slowing down and 
banks decided to change the form of investment and put their money into the 
stock market. It means that the shadow banking in China has transformed from 
a relatively safe into a more risky investment system. An essential issue is that they 
did it in a very leveraged way, converting equity investments into structured prod-
ucts. They used the underlying stocks for creation fixed-return products and varia-
ble-return products (Archarya, Qian, & Yang, 2015). The first category of products 
were offered for ordinary depositors and the second for hedge funds and other 
investors with riskier investment profiles. This mechanism meant linking bank-
ing operations with capital market. It created high leverage and contributed to the 
creation of a speculative bubble in the Chinese capital market. The whole situa-
tion generates a danger for Chinese banks of a loss given default (Altman, 2015). 
If there will happen a crisis, the future of the whole system will depend on wheth-
er the banks and regulators will be able to prevent run on the shadow banking in-
stitutions in China.
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A very important danger associated with the Chinese shadow banking is its 
impact on the world economy. Theoretically the threat of the Chinese financial 
market for the world economy should be unimportant because the size of the mar-
ket is insignificant. Banking debt problems in emerging markets should be rath-
er domestic without global systemic implications. Despite this some analysts have 
a fear that if something wrong happens in the China’s financial sector, it can spill 
over to foreign banks and investors, because China is becoming increasingly in-
tegrated with the global financial system (Yao & Hu, 2015). If there are any prob-
lems in the Chinese capital market, the global economy will bear the consequenc-
es. Even if the threats will cause only a slowdown of the Chinese growth, it can 
send a shockwaves and have strong impact on the whole world economy. It shows 
how important is the Chinese shadow banking. If it is better regulated, it will avert 
the next global crisis.
4. Proposals for Chinese shadow banking regulation
The last turbulences in the Chinese economy have shown that regulatory reform 
in the country’s financial system is needed. The necessary regulatory changes for 
the shadow banking sector were among the key guidelines developed by the Chi-
nese government in recent years. The Chinese authorities very strongly stressed the 
need to regulate the shadow banking system in the 12th Five-year-Plan for the pe-
riod 2011–2015 (The 12th Five-year Plan..., 2012). Additionally in January 2014, the 
Chinese government promulgated a document with respect to regulation of shad-
ow banking in China, entitled Circular of the General Office of the State Council on 
Relevant Issues of Strengthening the Regulation of Shadow Banking (Circular of the 
General Office..., 2013). It is the latest regulatory framework in China, related to the 
shadow banking issues (Huang, 2015).
In general the regulatory approach concentrates on three important aspects:
– determination of the shadow banking supervision powers and clear ar-
rangements of their responsibilities,
– guidelines on transparency – e.g. rules of shadow banking statistics and in-
formation policy,
– regulations for institutions and products – e.g. referring to banks’ WMP, 
trust companies, small-loan companies, etc.
A key issue for efficient regulation is proper institutional regulatory structure. 
The current financial regulatory framework in China is sector-based approach, 
with separate regulators for banking, securities and insurance (the China Bank-
ing Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission). They conduct the supervision togeth-
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er with the central bank (the People’s Bank of China). The new regulation (Circular 
No. 107) states, that the responsibility for shadow banking regulation is divided be-
tween all the enumerated supervisors. It states clearly that whoever approves the es-
tablishment of the shadow banking entity shall be responsible for regulating it. The 
general opinion is that it introduces transparency for the supervision task, howev-
er some critics highlight, that sometimes shadow banking products are cross-sec-
tor in nature, what will cause some competence problems in the future. Despite this 
shortcoming, the regulation is treated as a significant achievement. At the inter-
national arena sometimes are applied different models of supervision (e.g. “twin-
peaks” model or “integrated model”) but in the Chinese context the adopted one 
seems to be adequate to the challenges. Some changes should be considered for the 
future but with the present level of the financial market development the adopted 
solutions seem to be sufficient.
Shadow banking by its nature leads to a reduction of transparency of financial 
institutions and capital flows. In conjunction with regulatory arbitrage it leads to 
a decline in the effectiveness of macro-prudential regulation and increase of sys-
temic risk. The enhancement of transparency is one of the most important elements 
of the Chinese government strategy to ensure a sound development of banks and 
non-bank financial service providers. It is essential for securing the investor protec-
tion and the proper functioning of the financial market. The Chinese banks are ex-
pected to disclose information accurately and in timely manner about all aspects of 
the issuance, rolling over and maintain of WMP in order to make them more trans-
parent (Sekine, 2013). Some efforts in this direction have been taken e.g. in the area 
of WMP products transparency was improved by requiring banks to maintain sep-
arate accounts for each WMP with transparent documentation of assets funded by 
each WMP account. The use of funding pools by bank WMP and trust plans for 
investment in non-standardized debt instruments was prohibited (Zhu & Conrad, 
2014). There is a need for increase transparency in non-bank lending activities. It 
means that should be implemented some rules enabling better oversight and prop-
er risk management to facilitate more rational assessment of credit risk.
There were some specific requirements among the regulations for the shad-
ow banking institutions and products. An example is the requirement of the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) that commercial banks must limit their 
involvement of WMP proceeds in credit-related assets at any time to below the low-
er of 35% of WMP fund balance or 4% of banks’ total assets. Another example re-
lates to trusts. The CBRC requires trust product to discontinue the asset/fund pool 
business model (Yao, 2015).
In conclusion, the regulations already implemented in China will have two-di-
mensional impact on the country: impact on financial institutions and impact on 
the economy. The regulatory impact on financial institutions means tightening the 
regulations on shadow banking activities and the financing conditions to the pri-
vate sector. Implemented restrictions not only tighten up the shadow banking ac-
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tivities, but require traditional banks to move away from shadow banking business 
and return to the traditional deposit-taking and lending business.
Shadow banking in China differs from the system in developed countries and 
the fact determines its regulation proposals. The first priority is strictly connected 
with the reason of the emergence and rapid growth of shadow banking. Many sec-
tors and entities of the Chinese economy faced difficulty in obtaining bank loan or 
other sources of funding. This is especially apparent in the case of small and medi-
um enterprises (SMEs). Shadow banking (e.g. credit guarantee companies, leasing 
companies, pawn shops) has become an important source of financing many such 
entities and households. The present regulatory reforms in China require very high 
sensitivity in this area. On the one hand formal banks should be encouraged to in-
crease funding SMEs and households, but on the other hand such changes require 
a lot of time. Regulatory changes should not cut off these entities of funding but it 
should be more traditional, regulated way of funding.
Conclusions
The Chinese economy has been growing rapidly during the last two decades and 
has a great influence on the financial market’s development in the country. The 
market is asymmetrical – it provides funding primarily for the big, state-owned en-
terprises, but many smaller businesses (especially private), have problems with ac-
cess to the highly restricted banking financing. This is the main reason of the shad-
ow banking development in China.
China did not restrain the shadow banking after the financial crisis of 2007 
–2009. It has become quite the contrary, the crisis led to a greater development of 
the credit intermediation behind the traditional banking sector. The process was 
strengthened by the stimulus package, prepared by the Chinese government in re-
sponse to the crisis and strict government controls over the official interest rates.
The collapses on the Chinese real estate market and the stock exchange helped 
to realize by analysts and the government, how is the real danger connected with 
shadow banking. The high risk connected with the growth of Chinese shadow 
banking has mobilized the country’s government to some regulatory reforms. The 
changes include some key areas: new model of financial market supervision, great-
er transparency on the operations hidden “in the shadow” and implementation of 
prudential regulations for the shadow banking institutions and products.
It is difficult to anticipate the impact of the introduced regulations for few rea-
sons:
– The Chinese financial market is in the middle of its development and the di-
rections of the development are unpredictable.
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– The effectiveness of the implemented regulations in China will depend on 
the appropriate investment financing policy, which is necessary for the real 
economy.
– The existence of two contradictive regulatory effects – the unstable situation 
of the economy forces the government to strengthen the regulation, but too 
strict regulations are encouraging the market participants for locating their 
transactions outside the official, regulated market.
– Similarly as in the other developing countries in the past, further develop-
ment of the Chinese economy will be dependent on its opening, which in 
turn will weaken the national regulations in the confrontation with foreign 
capital.
The awareness of the risks generated by the shadow banking system is increas-
ing, so for sure it will cause greater attention on this sector than in the past. Only 
such approach, combined with a flexible response to occurring processes and new 
threats are able to provide greater security of the Chinese financial market.
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